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Abstract 
This paper examines the bank lending channel of monetary transmission in Malaysia, a country 
with a dual banking system including both Islamic and conventional banks, over the period 
1994:01-2015:06. A two-regime threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) model is estimated 
to take into account possible nonlinearities in the relationship between bank lending and 
monetary policy under different economic conditions. The results indicate that Islamic credit 
is less responsive than conventional credit to interest rate shocks in both the high and low 
growth regimes; however, the sub-sample estimation shows that its response has increased in 
more recent years becoming quite similar to that of conventional credit. Moreover, the relative 
importance of Islamic credit shocks in driving output growth is notable in the low growth 
regime, their effects being positive. These findings can be interpreted in terms of the distinctive 
features of Islamic banks.  
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1. Introduction 
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy has been analysed extensively in numerous 
studies focusing on countries with conventional banking systems (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995; Çatık and Martin, 2012; Pacicco et al., 2019; among others). In addition, an increasing 
body of research has provided evidence of asymmetries or nonlinearities in the impact of 
monetary policy on macroeconomic variables such as the inflation rate and GDP growth (e.g., 
Caporale et al., 2018 among others). Monetary policy appears to be different in economic 
expansion (growth) and contraction (recession) phases as its effectiveness over the phases of 
the business cycle might be different (Castro, 2011). For instance, Garcia and Schaller (2002) 
show that the response of central banks during contractions has a larger impact than during 
economic expansions. 
However, there is very little evidence concerning economies with a dual (Islamic and 
conventional) banking system, where this mechanism might be rather different given the 
distinctive features of Islamic finance, such as the prohibition to charge a predetermined 
interest rate and the granting of credit only to productive projects (Chong and Liu, 2009): 
financing speculative activities is restricted since these are thought to cause an increase in the 
price level without contributing to the real economy, social justice and economic efficiency, 
which Islamic finance should promote according to Sharia law1 (Kammer et al., 2015; Caporale 
and Helmi, 2018). For instance, Kassim et al. (2009) estimated a VAR model and reported 
instead that credit is more sensitive to interest rate movements in the case of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia, which might make them more unstable. Recently, Aysan et al. (2017) employed a 
panel-VAR model including deposits and credits for Islamic and conventional banks and 
confirmed the existence of a bank lending channel in Turkey, with both credit and deposits 
responding to changes in interest rates. However, monetary authorities might respond 
differently in economic expansion (growth) and contraction (recession) phases and, therefore, 
follow a nonlinear approach. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on Islamic finance by adopting a more suitable 
and sophisticated econometric framework to analyse monetary transmission in a country with 
a dual banking system (Islamic and conventional banks). Specifically, it applies for the first 
time in this context a nonlinear model to study the possibly asymmetric responses to shocks by 
                                                 
1 Sharia law is based on the Quran, the hadith and Islamic jurisprudence developed by many Muslim scholars. 
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policymakers in Malaysia: it estimates a Threshold VAR model (TVAR) with the output gap 
as the threshold variable. Most previous related studies on dual banking systems use only the 
conventional VAR approach and ignore the recent development in the macroeconomics 
literature suggesting asymmetric responses to shocks by policymakers (see, e.g., Sukmana and 
Kassim, 2010; Ergeç and Arslan, 2013; Aysan et al. 2017).2 Further, empirical studies on 
Malaysia have not explored yet whether the reaction of both Islamic and conventional banks 
differs during economic expansion (growth) and contraction (recession) phases, even though 
Khalid et al. (2018) more recently confirmed that using the Markov Switching Vector 
Autoregression model nonlinear framework is more appropriate for the Taylor rule in Malaysia. 
Therefore, the present study aims to fill this gap by allowing for nonlinearities in the bank 
lending channel in the case of Malaysia. 3  
More specifically, it analyses the role of both Islamic and conventional credit during the 
different phases of the business cycle. Our TVAR model has several interesting features that 
make it particularly suitable for analysing the impact of monetary policy on bank lending 
behaviour in the case of Malaysia. First, it allows for potential nonlinearities in the responses 
to monetary policy shocks, which is crucial since the impact of the latter may depend upon the 
macroeconomic conditions. Second, since the threshold variable is treated as an endogenous 
variable, regime switches resulting from structural shocks can also be captured (Atanasova, 
2003; Balke, 2000): the impulse response functions in a TVAR model depend on the size and 
sign of shocks as well as the state of the economy.     
Our results show that Islamic credit is less responsive than conventional credit to interest rate 
shocks in both high and low growth regimes in Malaysia. However, the sub-sample estimation 
suggests that it has increased in recent years becoming quite similar to that of conventional 
credit. Moreover, the relative importance of Islamic credit shocks in driving output growth is 
notable in the low growth regime, their effects being positive.  
                                                 
2 Çatık and Martin (2012) extended the work of Çatık and Karaçuka (2012) by using a TVAR model to analyse 
different monetary transmission mechanisms; however, they did not consider the possible role of Islamic finance. 
They found that the response to macroeconomic shocks has become different in Turkey compared to other market 
economies following the introduction of inflation targeting.   
3 This country has one of the largest Islamic banking sectors in the world, accounting for around 16.7% of the 
Islamic finance global market in 2014 (Ernst and Young, 2014). Further, it has had well-established Islamic 
financial institutions for over 30 years, with the share of Islamic finance growing from 0.073% in 1994 to 27.846% 
in 2016 at a compounded annual growth rate of 38.3% compared to 7.9% for conventional banks. Islamic banks 
are expected to grow at a yearly rate of 18% for the next five years, with the Malaysian authorities planning to 
increase their market share to 40% of total financing by 2020 and aiming to make the country an international hub 
for Islamic finance (BNM, 2012). 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews Islamic finance and the different role of 
Islamic and conventional banks in the bank lending channel of monetary policy; Section 3 
describes the data and provides a preliminary analysis; Section 4 outlines the methodology; 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results; finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.  
2. Islamic Finance and the Monetary Policy Transmission Channels 
2.1 Islamic Finance 
Although Islamic banks share some features with conventional financial intermediaries, they 
differ from the latter in that they operate on the basis of the Sharia principles outlined in the 
Quran, the hadith4 and Islamic jurisprudence, with the ex-post PLS rate replacing the 
predetermined rate of commercial banks (Chong and Liu, 2009). The prohibition of the 
conventional ex-ante interest rate is seen as instrumental to improving both social justice and 
economic efficiency (Berg and Kim, 2014). That is, Islamic banking is a case of ethical finance 
and hence it has economic implications for systemic stability and the distribution of credit risk, 
since the productivity of the project, rather than the creditworthiness of borrowers (as in the 
case of conventional banks) is the main factor determining the allocation of credit (see Di 
Mauro et al., 2013). 
Another important feature of Islamic banks is that they are not allowed to engage in any 
speculative transactions such as derivatives, toxic assets and gambling, which are not compliant 
with Sharia principles (Beck et al., 2013). It is reckoned that financing such activities is 
responsible for many financial crises and normally causes an increase in the price level rather 
than contributing to real activities in the economy (Di Mauro et al., 2013). Speculative 
investments make conventional banks “risk transferring” while Islamic banks are “risk sharing” 
(see Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Further, Islamic banks only provide credit to finance productive 
investment rather than speculative activities (Kammer et al., 2015). Each financial transaction 
is underpinned by an existing or potential real asset, whilst conventional banks can provide 
credit without such constraints (Askari, 2012). In addition, Islamic banks cannot generate profit 
based on pure financing so they must engage, for instance, in investment or sale transactions 
and share both the return and the risk of the contract (Baele et al., 2014). 
                                                 
4 Hadith represents the actions and sayings of the prophet Mohammad, which are one of the main sources of 
Islamic guidance in many aspects of Muslim life including economic activities. 
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2.2 Evolution of Islamic banks in Malaysia and other countries  
The assets and market share of Islamic banks have grown considerably over the last decade.  
In 2016, more than $2.6 trillion were invested in Sharia-compliant assets and this figure is 
expected to reach $3 trillion in 2018. Table 1 shows the assets of Islamic banks in selected 
countries over a period of eight years. It is apparent that their shares are different across 
countries, varying from 100% in both Iran and Sudan to less than 1% in Singapore. However, 
there has been a significant increase in the market share of Islamic banks in all countries; for 
instance, in Pakistan, it rose from 3.8% in 2007 to 11.4% in 2015 and it more than doubled in 
Jordan from 6.20% in 2007 to 14.9% in 2015. The average increase in the market share of 
Islamic banks is 12.5% in the 14 countries considered (see Table 1). 5  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Figure 1 shows that Islamic banking in the GCC has a market share of 25%-50% highlighting 
its importance in providing funds to the local economy. Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia have the 
highest market share (53.7%) in the region, followed by Kuwait (45.2%). In Bahrain, the 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar this sector represents 23-29% of total banking assets. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Of particular interest is the case of Malaysia, where bank credit represents 70% of total finance. 
Further, it has had well-established Islamic financial institutions for over 34 years (BNM, 
2015). The Islamic bank Act (IBA) was introduced in 1983, and the first Islamic bank started 
its operation in the same year. Conventional banks were allowed to open an Islamic finance 
window in March 1993. There was a sharp increase in the market share of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia from less than 1% in 1994 to around 26.36% in 2015 with a compounded annual 
growth rate of 38.3% compared to 7.9% for conventional banks (see Figure 2). Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM) aims to increase the market share of Islamic banks to 40% of total financing 
by 2020 in order to make Malaysia an international hub for Islamic finance (BNM, 2012).   
 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 These countries represent more than 93% of international Islamic banking assets (Ernst and Young, 2016). 
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2.3 Monetary Policy Transmission Channels  
 
It is essential for policymakers to examine how the effects of monetary policy shocks are 
transmitted to the real economy. For instance, a contractionary policy leads to an increase in 
real interest rates, which causes a decline in investment spending, aggregate demand and GDP 
growth. Monetary policy can also affect the value of equities (e.g. stocks and real estate) 
through an increase in interest rates resulting in a decline in both consumption and investment 
expenditure.  
 
The traditional monetary policy channels have been examined in many empirical studies, with 
mixed results (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Çatık and Martin, 2012 Pacicco et al., 2019 
among others). Some authors (Mishkin, 1995) have argued that the effects on the real economy 
are related not only to asset prices, interest rate and cost of capital but also to frictions in 
financial intermediation. Therefore, credit should be considered as an important channel for 
policy transmission. Next we discuss the essential role of the bank lending channel in Malaysia, 
where most economic activities are funded through loans from both Islamic and conventional 
banks. 
 
2.3.1 The Bank Lending Channel 
 
The bank lending channel (also called narrow credit) shows how the effects of changes in 
monetary policy rates are transmitted to the economy through the supply of credit facilities by 
banks. Medium- and small-sized firms fund their activities mainly through banks, while large 
corporations have access to bank credit as well as non-banking sources of credit through the 
financial markets (see Kashyap and Stein, 1995 among others). If the supply of banks credit to 
the private sectors is decreased, the external finance premium increases, which causes a decline 
in output. For instance, contractionary monetary policy, draining bank reserves and deposits, 
will decrease the supply of loanable funds. This decreases households’ and firms’ spending, 
and reduces real economic activities (Mishkin, 2001).  
 
Further, medium and small-sized companies are more affected by monetary policy actions than 
large companies with easy access to other financial securities, such as bonds and equities. For 
instance, when there is an increase in interest rates, large companies are more likely to raise 
capital from the financial market, while the medium and small-sized companies still have to 
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heavily depend on bank loans to finance their operational activities (see Boivin et al., 2010). 
Although this channel is very important in all economies, it is expected to play an even more 
significant role in transmitting monetary policy shocks to the real economy in developing 
countries and emerging markets (Mishkin, 1995b), since these economies are either bank-based 
or have less developed financial markets, which are less liquid compared to those of the 
developed countries.  
< Insert Table 2 about here> 
The discussion above highlights the role of conventional banks in the transmission mechanism 
of the monetary policy, especially in the developing and emerging economies. Recently, the 
growing role of Islamic finance in some countries has come to the attention of researchers.  The 
share of Islamic banks has increased in Malaysia from less than 1% in 1994 to 27.84% in 2016 
with a compounded annual growth rate of 38.3% compared to 7.9% for conventional banks 
(see Table 2). Given this very sizeable growth, it is important to investigate how monetary 
policy is transmitted through the banking channel in a dual banking system (Islamic and 
conventional banking) such as the Malaysian one, which is the objective of this study. 
2.3.2 Islamic vs. Conventional Banks and Monetary Policy 
Investigating the effectiveness of monetary policy in a dual banking system is a challenging 
task. It requires identifying the role of Islamic banks in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy as they have a different business model. Further, the importance of Islamic 
banks for the bank lending channel is still being debated (Ibrahim and Alam, 2017). They play 
the same role as conventional ones as financial intermediates but are different from the point 
of view of the interest rates charged and their business model. For, example, Islamic banks are 
not allowed to charge pre-determined interest rate on loans or offer a fixed rate on deposits, 
that is, they operate according to the Sharia principles. Their role depends on several factors 
such as their market share and the structure of Islamic contracts. In addition, Islamic financial 
instruments, such as money and interbank markets, are either underdeveloped or have not been 
established in some countries with Islamic banks such as Syria.  
Ibrahim and Alam (2017) argue that the restriction on providing funds to some prohibited 
business activities (e.g., producing Alcohol, weapons, etc.) might affect the contribution of 
Islamic credit to the economy compared to commercial credit. However, Islamic banks provide 
a significant percentage of their funds to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which usually 
have limited access to credit through conventional banks and this might increase the financial 
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inclusion of SMEs.6 For instance, Kim et al. (2018) show that financial inclusion strengthens 
financial deepening and has positive impact on economic growth in the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) countries.    
In a dual banking system, the lack of market-based instruments and the underdevelopment of 
the Islamic money market have restricted the liquidity facilities for these banks and limited 
their access to various tools for liquidity management, which forces them to hold more liquidity 
and has an impact on their profitability (Di Mauro, et al., 2013; Ibrahim and Alam, 2017). In 
addition, Islamic banks are considered to be less cost effective and over capitalized, which 
makes them less competitive in a dual banking system (Beck et al., 2013). The behaviour of 
customers in response to changes in the interest rate depends on the characteristics of clients. 
Religion–motivated customers with religious constraints are less likely to switch their deposits 
to conventional banks if the rate of return on deposits in Islamic banks becomes lower than 
their conventional counterparts (Baele et al., 2014). By contrast, profit-motivated customers 
characterized by economic rationality might switch their deposits to conventional banks to 
exploit such an arbitrage opportunity (Aysan et al., 2018). Further, the spillovers from the 
conventional banks to their Islamic counterparts expose them to a form of risk called displaced 
commercial risk (DCR), since increases in the interest rate charged by conventional banks may 
cause a withdrawal of deposits from Islamic banks (Daher et al., 2015 and Baldwin et al., 2018). 
For the reasons discussed above, the bank lending channel is expected to work differently for 
Islamic vis-a-vis conventional banks. This is confirmed by the few existing studies on Malaysia 
and other countries (e.g., Kassim et al., 2009; Aysan et al., 2017 among others). As in the case 
of other emerging markets, in Malaysia financial markets are dominated by bank credit, which 
represents 70% of total finance (BNM, 2015). Further, the PLS paradigm might increase the 
access to finance for medium and small -sized enterprises, which are classified as the main 
borrowers of Islamic banks in Malaysia and elsewhere (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2013). Moreover, 
Islamic banks provide credit to households and private sectors not normally dealing with banks 
for religious reasons, which results in higher financial inclusion (see Baele et al., 2014).  
Only a few studies have examined monetary policy transmission mechanism in countries with 
both conventional and Islamic banks (see Kassim et al., 2009; Sukmana and Kassim, 2010; 
                                                 
6 Financial inclusion aims to offer fair opportunity and remove the barriers of certain segments of the society (e.g., 
poor farmers, SMEs, and rural enterprises) to access affordable financial products and services with a low-cost 
(Chakravarty and Pal, 2013). 
9 
 
Ergeç and Arslan, 2013, and Aysan et al., 2017). For instance, Khan and Mirakhor (1989) 
argued that Islamic banks are less affected by monetary shocks (and therefore are more stable) 
than conventional banks, the reason being that profit and loss sharing allows Islamic banks to 
transfer part of the risk to the depositors (Ghassan et al., 2013). Kassim et al. (2009) reported 
instead that credit is more sensitive to interest rate movements in the case of Islamic banks in 
Malaysia, which might make them more unstable using a vector autoregression (VAR) model. 
These results were confirmed by Akhatova et al. (2016) who estimate a SVAR, examining the 
reaction of both Islamic and conventional banks to monetary policy shocks in Malaysia. They 
find a significant response by Islamic banks to a positive interest rate shock. Similary, Sukmana 
and Kassim (2010) used a VAR framework and found significant evidence that Islamic banks 
in Malaysia contribute to the transmission of monetary policy shocks to the real economy 
through the banking channel; they argued that policymakers should address the issues specific 
to Islamic banks when designing and implementing monetary policy. 
Ergeç and Arslan (2013) used a vector error correction model (VECM) and found that 
movements in the overnight interest rate have asymmetric effects on Islamic and conventional 
banks in Turkey: for instance, a positive interest rate shock leads to an increase (decrease) in 
the level of deposits in conventional (Islamic) banks. Aysan et al. (2017) used a panel-VAR 
and found that Islamic bank credit is more responsive to interest rate shocks. Their findings 
can be explained by various reasons such as the compositional differences in credit portfolios 
between both banks and the tendency of Islamic banks toward SME credits. More specifically, 
they stressed that since SMEs are more sensitive to monetary and economic shocks, the loan 
demand for SME credits would also be more sensitive to monetary and economic shocks. 
However, Khatat (2016) argued that the lower responsiveness of Islamic credit to monetary 
policy shocks could be related to the behaviour of depositors and borrowers when reacting to 
interest rate movements and the level of development in the Islamic money markets. More 
recently, Hamza and Saadaoui (2018) examined the monetary transmission mechanism through 
Islamic banks’ debt financing channel using the system GMM estimator for a sample composed 
of 50 Islamic banks in 10 countries for the period 2005-2014. Their results showed that the 
financing level by Islamic banks decreases in response to a monetary tightening and confirmed 
the presence of a debt financing channel of monetary policy. 
None of the studies mentioned above examines the monetary transmission mechanism in 
countries with a dual banking system (including both Islamic and conventional banks) allowing 
for possible nonlinearities, thereby ignoring the recent development in the macroeconomics 
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literature suggesting asymmetric responses to shocks by policymakers. Given the special 
features of Islamic finance and the unique dual banking system in Malaysia, one would expect 
a different response to a monetary policy shock from Islamic compared to conventional banks. 
Allowing for nonlinearities enables the researcher to distinguish between the dynamic response 
of the two types of banks during contractions and expansions respectively. 
3. Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
To investigate the bank lending channel of monetary policy in the dual banking system of 
Malaysia, we collected monthly data for Islamic credit and conventional credit from the 
National Bank of Malaysia. In addition, data on the money supply (M2), the consumer price 
index (CPI), the industrial production index (IPI), and the overnight policy rate (I) were 
retrieved from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). The resulting sample includes 
258 monthly observations over the period 1994:01-2015:06.7 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
In order to examine the time series properties of the variables under consideration, a battery of 
unit root tests was carried out. In addition to the conventional augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests, we also performed the Lee and Strazicich (2003) one allowing 
for two structural breaks to take into account the possible impact of the global and local crises 
on the degree of integration of the series.8  The results of the Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests, 
reported in Table 3, confirm those of the ADF and PP tests, although several significant 
breakpoints are identified.9 Hence, all variables can be treated as I(1), and can be entered into 
the VAR/TVAR models in first differences. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
A wide range of descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4. The means of monthly total, 
conventional, and Islamic credit changes are all positive. The highest is that of Islamic credit 
changes, which highlights its sharp growth relative to conventional credit over the sample 
                                                 
7 The start date of our sample is set according to the availability of Islamic credit data from the National Bank of 
Malaysia. 
8 These test results of the ADF and the Phillips-Perron (1988) are not reported but are available upon request. 
9 The unit root with breaks test results indicate the statistical significance of several breakpoints for most variables 
including those related to the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis; however, they are sensitive to 
whether or not we allow for changes in the intercept only or both the intercept and trend. In general, there is no 
specific pattern which can be identified across variables in terms of the breakpoints corresponding to economic 
events occurring during the investigation period (see Table 3). 
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period. All other means are also positive, except that of policy rate changes, which is negative 
and small. Islamic credit changes are more volatile than both total and conventional credit 
changes, and both interest rate changes and industrial production growth are more volatile than 
inflation and money growth. Most variables exhibit skewness (positive in all cases, with the 
exception of policy rate changes) and excess kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics imply 
a rejection at the 5% level of the null hypothesis of normality.  
4. The Model  
The VAR approach is the most frequently used in the literature investigating the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Its advantage is that it does not require imposing possibly arbitrary 
exclusion restrictions, an issue even more relevant in the case of emerging countries whose 
economic structure is less well known (Mishra et al., 2012). Further, it estimates the dynamic 
response of the system to a shock without debatable identification restrictions (Sims, 1980). 
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), linear VAR models are often estimated. However, 
since monetary policy is designed differently during economic expansion (growth) and 
contraction (recession) phases, a nonlinear specification is more appropriate. Therefore, we 
investigate the bank lending channel in Malaysia by estimating a TVAR model, which is an 
extension of the linear VAR model in which the economy has two regimes and switches 
between them depending on the optimum value of the threshold variable. A two-regime TVAR 
model is specified as follows (Atanasova, 2003; Balke, 2000): 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐼[𝑐𝑡−𝑑 ≥ 𝛾](𝐴0
1 + ∑ 𝐵𝑡
1𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝐶𝑡
1𝑞
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑖) + 𝐼[𝑐𝑡−𝑑 < 𝛾](𝐴0
2 + ∑ 𝐵𝑡
2𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 +
∑ 𝐶𝑡
2𝑞
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑖) + 𝜀𝑡 , 
                             (1) 
where 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 stand for the vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables respectively,  𝐴0 
is the vector of intercept terms, 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐶𝑡 are parameter matrices, p and q are the lag orders of 
the endogenous and exogenous variables respectively, and 𝜀𝑡 is the vector of innovations with 
a variance covariance matrix of 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′) = ∑. Given that we use three alternative measures for 
credit (in logs), namely total credit (𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡), Islamic credit (𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡), and commercial or 
conventional credit (𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡), three different vectors of endogenous variables are used as 
follows:  
Model 1: 𝑌1,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 , 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡],     (2) 
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Model 2: 𝑌2,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 , 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡],                                      (3) 
 
Model 3: 𝑌3,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 , 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡],                                                 (4)
    
where 𝛥 is the first difference operator, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 stands for the interbank rate, 𝑙𝑚2𝑡 denotes the log 
of money supply M2, 𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the log of the CPI. Since GDP data are not available on a monthly 
basis, the log of the industrial production index, denoted by 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡, is used as a proxy for 
economic activity. Although the use of the money supply as a monetary policy instrument is 
disputed in the literature, we have decided to include this variable in order to capture some 
information about liquidity in the economy (Lucas, 2014). McCauley (2006) documents that 
the Central Bank of Malaysia drains reserves out of the banking system in the face of chronic 
excess liquidity or to keep short-term interest rates at their target level. For instance, it 
promoted the repo market by announcing in February 2005 that it would introduce several 
measures to enhance liquidity and make domestic financial markets (especially the ringgit bond 
market) more efficient.10 
In order to capture the possible effects of global developments on the conduct of monetary 
policy, the following exogenous variables are included when each of the above vectors of the 
endogenous variables are estimated (Peersman and Smets, 2003):  
𝑋𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡],        (5) 
where 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 is  the log of the world commodity price index (included to take into account 
the “price puzzle” as in Gordon and Leeper (1994)), 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡 is the US federal funds rate, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑡 
is the log of the US industrial production index, and, 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡 is the log of the domestic nominal 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar.  
Further, c is the threshold variable and 𝛾 is the optimum value of the threshold; 𝐼[. ] is the 
dummy indicator function that equals 1 when 𝑐𝑡−𝑑 ≥ 𝛾, and 0 otherwise. 𝑐𝑡−𝑑 is the threshold 
variable lagged by 𝑑 periods. The threshold variable is often defined as the moving average of 
                                                 
10 These measures include the active use of repurchase agreements (repo) as a monetary policy instrument, the 
introduction of the Institutional Securities Custodian Programme (ISCAP) to enable the borrowing and lending of 
securities, and a securities lending facility for principal dealers (BNM, 2006). 
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one of the endogenous variables in 𝑌𝑡 (see for example Balke, 2000). In our case, it is the 
twenty-four month moving average of the IPI growth rate,  𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑡−𝑑 (see Figure 3).
11  
< Insert Figure 3 about here> 
Equation (1) indicates that the economy is in regime 1 when the threshold variable exceeds or 
is equal to the optimal threshold value, i.e., 𝑐𝑡−𝑑 ≥ 𝛾, otherwise it is in regime 2. If there is no 
significant difference between the estimated parameters across the two regimes, i.e., 𝐴0
1 = 𝐴0
2,
𝐵𝑖
1 = 𝐵𝑖
2, 𝐶𝑖
1 = 𝐶𝑖
2, the threshold model reduces to a linear VAR one. 
The regime switching parameters (𝐴𝑖
1, 𝐴𝑖
2,  𝐵𝑖
1, 𝐵𝑖
2, 𝐶𝑖
1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑖
2), the threshold value (𝛾) and 
the delay parameter (𝑑) can all be estimated endogenously within this framework. First, the 
optimum number of lags of the endogenous and exogenous variables is determined on the basis 
of model selection criteria. Then, the existence of a threshold effect in a multivariate framework 
is tested using the 𝐶(𝑑) statistic introduced by Tsay (1998), which is a multivariate extension 
of Tsay’s (1989) nonlinearity test. The procedure is the following: the variables are ordered 
according to increasing values of the threshold variable, 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑡, then the VAR model is 
estimated recursively starting from the first 𝑚0 observations; finally, the test statistic is 
calculated by regressing the residuals on the explanatory variables, and testing for the joint 
significance of the latter. If the model is linear, the residuals should be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables; under the null of linearity, i.e., 𝐻0: 𝐴0
1 = 𝐴0
2, 𝐵𝑖
1 = 𝐵𝑖
2, 𝐶𝑖
1 = 𝐶𝑖
2, the 
test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with 𝑘(𝑝𝑘 + 𝑞𝑣 + 1) degrees of freedom, k and 
v being the number of variables in the vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables 
respectively, and p and q the corresponding lag orders.   
After the determination of the delay parameter, the 𝐶(𝑑) statistic is computed over the trimmed 
interval of the threshold parameter, (𝑐1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐2) = [0.15, 0.85], to maximise the probability of 
identifying the two regimes. Then, this interval is partitioned into grids, and the model is 
estimated for each grid. The grid, including the minimum selection criteria value, is selected 
as the optimal threshold value of the transition variable, 𝛾. The impulse response functions and 
                                                 
11 Following Balke (2000), we also consider a moving average of credit growth as another potential threshold 
variable. The results of the nonlinearity tests carried out indicate that the existence of a significant threshold effect 
is rejected when the total credit change is used as the threshold variable. Therefore, a moving average of IPI 
growth rate is used instead for the TVAR estimates. An alternative threshold variable is obtained applying the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to the IPI. The C(d) test results yield very similar regime classifications and qualitatively 
similar impulse responses and variance decompositions. These additional results are not reported in the paper but 
are available upon request.   
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forecast error decompositions obtained from this model are nonlinear since the parameters are 
allowed to evolve over regimes.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
Threshold Value Estimation 
A pre-requisite to the estimation of the TVAR models is the computation of C(d) statistics to 
uncover the presence of a threshold effect in a multivariate framework. The results from the 
recursive estimation based on the starting points of m0=25 and m0=50 and the delay parameters 
of 𝑑 = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are presented in Table 5. Except the fourth and fifth lags of model 3, the 
null hypothesis of linearity is rejected at the 5% significance level. This implies that there are 
two different regimes corresponding to different phases of the business cycle. The optimum 
delay parameter of the threshold variable, 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑡−𝑑, is estimated to be equal to 3 for all three 
TVAR specifications on the basis of the 𝜒2 test statistic. Then, the interval containing the 
possible optimal threshold value of the 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑡−𝑑 [-0.709 12.025] is partitioned into 500 grids, 
and the optimal threshold value for each TVAR model is obtained in the grid satisfying the 
minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  The estimated threshold values of 5.561%, 
5.558% and 5.556% for models 1, 2, and 3, respectively, lead to very similar regime 
classifications. It is also noteworthy that the endogenously estimated optimal threshold values 
are slightly above the average growth rate of industrial production (5.294%) over the 
investigation period. On that basis, regimes 1 and 2 can be defined as the upper and lower 
growth regimes respectively, since they contain observations above or below the optimal 
threshold.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
Having identified the regimes, generalized impulse response functions are estimated (see 
Figures 4 to 9) and forecast error variance decomposition analysis (see Tables 6 and 7) is 
conducted for the three TVAR models (see Eqs. (2), (3) and (4)).  The results from a simple 
linear VAR model are also presented for comparison purposes.  
Responses of GDP Growth and Inflation to Monetary Policy Shocks 
Figures 4 and 5 show the estimated responses of output growth and inflation respectively to a 
positive interest rate and negative money supply shock (a tightening of monetary policy), 
computed from the TVAR (model 1) and the corresponding simple linear VAR model. 
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In the case of the linear VAR (see Figure 4) the effect of the interest rate shock on output 
growth is what one would anticipate: a rise in the policy rate decreases output growth, which 
bottoms out about two months after the shock occurs. However, the TVAR estimation suggests 
that the response of output growth to the interest rate shock is regime dependent, being greater 
in the low than in the high growth regime (see Figure 5). This finding is in line with those of 
Peersman and Smets (2002), Garcia and Schaller (2002), and Avdjiev and Zeng (2014), who 
also reported that monetary policy shocks have a stronger impact on GDP growth when the 
economy is in the low economic growth regime. Regarding the response of inflation to the 
interest rate shock (Figure 4), the initial positive response is relatively small in the high growth 
regime, and then becomes negative before weakening and dying out in the following months. 
By contrast, in the low growth regime (and in the linear VAR) the initial positive response is 
larger and increases further during the first month, after which it decreases until it dies out. The 
qualitative results are rather similar when commodity prices are replaced with the oil price as 
an exogenous variable to mitigate the issue of the “price puzzle” (see Figure A1 in the 
Appendix A). Therefore, they confirm its existence12 in the lower growth regime and are 
consistent with those of Hanson (2004), who estimated a structural vector autoregressive 
(SVAR) model and found that most indicators (e.g., commodity prices and oil price) used to 
mitigate the “price puzzle” cannot resolve it over certain sample periods. 
Concerning the effects of a negative money supply shock (Figure 5), visual inspection suggests 
that the dynamic impact of such a shock on GDP growth is also not the same across the two 
regimes. For instance, the initial impact in the high growth regime is significantly negative and 
it takes one month for such an effect to die out. By contrast, in the low growth regime the 
impact becomes notable in the second month, when it leads to a significant decline in GDP 
growth, after which it dies out over the following months. With respect to the response of 
inflation, the initial impact of a negative money supply shock is negative (positive) in the high 
(low) growth regime. It is noteworthy that the negative impact in the high regime weakens over 
the first two months, whereas the positive effect in the low regime becomes negative in the 
second month, after which it dies out over the following months. 13 
<Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here> 
                                                 
12 The “price puzzle” concerns an increase in the price level following a contractionary monetary shock (Sims, 
1992 and Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Recent papers on the “price puzzle” include Castelnuovo and Surico 
(2010) and Çatık and Martin (2012), among others. 
13 The results of the effects of positive interest rate and negative money supply shocks on output growth and 
inflation obtained from models 2 and 3 were qualitatively the same and are available upon request.  
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Responses of Credit Variables to Monetary Policy Shocks 
Figure 6 displays the impulse responses of total, conventional and Islamic credit changes to 
interest rate shocks, obtained respectively from models 1, 2 and 3. It can be seen that the 
dynamic responses of the credit market to monetary policy shocks change as the economy shifts 
from one phase of the business cycle to another. Specifically, a positive interest rate shock 
generally leads to a decline in conventional and Islamic credit, especially when the economy 
operates in the low growth regime. Moreover, Islamic credit appears to be less responsive than 
conventional credit to the interest rate shock in both growth regimes; also, the response of the 
former (latter) credit is negligible in the higher growth regime.  
Figure 7 shows the responses of each type of credit to a negative money supply shock. It is 
evident that both react, with the initial effect in both cases being negative in the lower regime; 
also, it takes one (two) month(s) for the response of conventional (Islamic) credit to settle 
down. In the higher regime, the initial effect of the shock on conventional (Islamic) credit is 
negative (positive), and becomes weaker within the first month. 14 
<Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here> 
 
Responses of GDP Growth and Inflation to Credit Shocks 
Figures 8 and 9 display the effects of a tightening in total, conventional and Islamic credit 
respectively on output growth and inflation based on the estimated linear and TVAR models. 
In general, the effects on both output growth and inflation are negative, except for the effect of 
Islamic credit on growth in the low regime which is positive in the first month and then 
becomes negative in the following few months. Further, the effects on inflation are higher in 
the low than in the high growth regime. Intuitively, a negative credit shock has more adverse 
effect on aggregate demand and hence on the price level when the economy is operating below 
full capacity (the low growth phase) than when the economy is overheating (the high growth 
phase) (Avdjiev and Zeng, 2014).  
                                                 
14 To gain further insights into these findings, we obtained additional VAR estimates for the response of credit 
over the different sub-samples covering the period before and after 2002 since Islamic credit was marginal and 
less than 7% of total credit before 2002. Sub-sample estimation was also carried out over the period before and 
after 2004 because the Central Bank of Malaysia has used the overnight interest rate as a policy rate since April 
2004. These sub-sample results are shown in Figures A2 to A5 in the Appendix A and imply that Islamic credit 
became more sensitive to changes in the interest rate in the post-2002 and 2004 periods, with an increase in the 
Islamic share credit since then. 
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Comparatively Islamic credit shocks have a lower impact than conventional credit ones on both 
output growth and inflation in both regimes; the impact of both credits is relatively stronger in 
the lower than in the high regime. Possible explanations for these findings are the lower share 
of Islamic banking in the financial system of Malaysia, the principles of Islamic finance not 
allowing Islamic banks to engage in speculative or prohibited activities, and the 
underdevelopment of the Islamic money market (Khatat, 2016). 
<Insert Figures 8 and 9 about here> 
 
Variance Decomposition (VD) Analysis 
We also carry out Variance Decomposition (VD) analysis to capture the dynamic effect of a 
shock to endogenous variables over a forecast horizon of 15 months. The forecast error 
variance decomposition analysis from the linear and TVAR models (see Tables 6 and 7) 
corroborates the findings of the linear and threshold impulse responses by highlighting clear 
differences between the low and high growth regimes.  
Tables 6 and 7 report the VD respectively for inflation and output growth (from models 1, 2, 
and 3). Both the linear and threshold results imply that most of the forecast error variance of 
inflation is explained by its own shocks. The linear model seems to underestimate the 
contribution of credit changes, which appears to be much higher in the nonlinear models 
(especially in the lower regime). More specifically, conventional credit changes explain more 
of the variations in inflation, especially in the low growth regime, than Islamic credit changes 
that seem to play a relatively minor role (slightly greater in the high growth regime). For 
instance, in the low growth regime, over a 15-month horizon, conventional credit changes 
account for 8.4 percent of the total variation in inflation as opposed to 1.792 percent in the case 
of Islamic credit changes. This finding might reflect the distinctive features of Islamic credit, 
which only funds transactions related to a tangible underlying asset rather than speculative 
activities, hence affecting inflation less (Adeola, 2007; Kassim, 2016; and Caporale and Helmi, 
2018). 
<Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here> 
As for output growth (Table 7), it appears that in the high growth regime most of its variation 
is driven by conventional credit, followed by money supply and then Islamic credit. Instead in 
the low growth regime its variation is mostly explained by the interest rate, followed by 
inflation, and then both conventional and Islamic credits. Concerning the relative contribution 
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of conventional versus Islamic credit, the former (7.949 percent) is higher than the latter (3.598 
percent) over a 15-month forecast horizon in the high growth regime. However, in the low 
growth one their relative importance is reversed: Islamic and conventional credit changes 
account respectively for 12.209 and 4.631 percent of the variation over the same forecast 
horizon of 15 months. The sizeable contribution of Islamic credit changes to output growth in 
the low growth regime could be attributed to the Islamic banks’ business model and business 
ethics, which encourage investment, and hence enhance economic growth (Kassim, 2016). 
Specifically, the PLS paradigm and asset-based Islamic banking make these institutions less 
vulnerable and more stable during financial crises; for instance, the growth in assets and credit 
of Islamic banks continued to be higher than those of conventional banks during the recent 
financial crisis of 2007-08 in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey and 
Malaysia (see Hasan and Dridi, 2010). 
 
6. Conclusions 
There is a growing debate on the different responses of monetary authorities to shocks during 
economic expansion (growth) and contraction (recession) phases and, therefore, the need to 
adopt a nonlinear econometric approach. This paper provides new insights by taking into 
account possible nonlinearities in the relationship between bank lending and monetary policy 
under different economic conditions in the Malaysian dual banking system during the period 
1994:01-2015:06. Most previous related studies on dual banking systems use only a 
conventional VAR approach and ignore the recent development in the macroeconomics 
literature suggesting asymmetric responses to shocks by policymakers (see, e.g., Kassim et al., 
2009; Sukmana and Kassim, 2010; Ergeç and Arslan, 2013; Aysan et al. 2017). Moreover, 
these empirical studies on Malaysia have not explored whether the reaction of both Islamic and 
conventional banks differs during economic expansion (growth) and contraction (recession) 
phases, even though Khalid et al. (2018) confirmed that using the Markov Switching Vector 
Autoregression model nonlinear framework is more appropriate to model the Taylor rule in 
Malaysia. 
The present paper employs a two-regime TVAR model allowing for nonlinearities, hence 
offering a more reliable assessment of the bank lending channel in the Malaysian dual banking 
system over the different phases of the business cycle. Our TVAR model has several interesting 
features that make it particularly suitable for analysing the impact of monetary policy on bank 
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lending behaviour in the case of Malaysia by allowing the responses to monetary policy shocks 
to depend upon the macroeconomic conditions. 
Our main findings indicate that Islamic credit is less responsive than conventional credit to 
interest rate shocks in both the high and low growth regimes. However, the sub-sample 
estimates indicate that its response has increased in more recent years becoming quite similar 
to that of conventional credit. Moreover, our results confirm that the bank lending channel in 
Malaysia is state-dependent, differing in the low and high growth regimes; the (positive) effects 
of Islamic credit changes on output growth are more pronounced in the low growth regime. 
These findings are broadly consistent with the existing evidence on the state-dependence of the 
transmission channels of monetary policy in developed economies. Moreover, they can be 
interpreted in terms of the distinctive features of Islamic banks, which operate according to the 
principles of Islamic finance, and therefore charge the ex-post PLS rate instead of conventional 
interest rates, and only finance projects directly linked to real economic activities (Berg and 
Kim, 2014). Given the evidence suggesting that Islamic credit boosts growth during low growth 
periods, policy-makers should take into account the Islamic bank lending channel in the design 
of monetary policy in economies with a dual (Islamic and conventional) banking system at 
such times. Policies aimed at improving the institutional structure and the efficiency of Islamic 
banks might also be appropriate, with a view to making the transmission of monetary policy 
more effective in countries such as Malaysia. 
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Table 1: Market share and number of Islamic banks by country.  
 
Country 
Market Share of Islamic Banks %  % 
Changes 
2007-
2015 
No of 
Islamic 
Banks 
2007 2012 2015 
Indonesia 0.621% 4.623% 5% 3.982% 6 
Turkey 2.960% 5.134% 5.432% 2.643% 5 
Iran 100% 100% 100% 0.00% 16 
Sudan 100% 100% 100% 0.00% 34 
Singapore 0.212% 0.061% N/A N/A 5 
Jordan 6.203% 13% 14.900% 8.745% 4 
Tunisia 1.514% 2.203% 4.991% 0.691% 3 
Malaysia 7.263% 21.351% 26.362 19.103% 18 
Kuwait 32.136% 37.721% 45.234% 13.114% 5 
Saudi Arabia 37% 53% 53.721% 16.736% 4 
UAE 15% 17% 23.534% 8.543% 8 
Bahrain 6.734% 26.924% 29.353% 22.612% 7 
Qatar 13% 24% 29% 16% 4 
Pakistan 3.824% 5.753% 11.404% 7.632% 5 
Average 23.320% 29.341% 235.292% 9.221%  
Sources: BankScope, Central Banks of different countries, Ernst and Young (2014, 2016) and author’s 
calculation. The countries in the table represent more than 93% of international Islamic banking assets 
(Ernst and Young, 2016). 
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Table 2. Islamic finance and market share (in billions of Malaysian ringgit). 
Year Conventional Credit  Islamic Credit Total Credit  Conventional 
Credit % 
Islamic 
Credit % 
1994 2146053.900 1564.000 2147617.900 99.927 0.072 
1995 2659210.100 12657.000 2671867.100 99.526 0.473 
1996 3413804.606 31625.436 3445430.042 99.082 0.917 
1997 4539882.779 64185.838 4604068.617 98.605 1.394 
1998 4951279.604 87805.270 5039084.874 98.257 1.742 
1999 4696946.848 129926.909 4826873.757 97.308 2.691 
2000 4637357.715 200841.440 4838199.155 95.848 4.151 
2001 4809882.934 301883.581 5111766.515 94.094 5.905 
2002 4934721.500 399125.000 5333846.500 92.517 7.482 
2003 5043652.034 527895.366 5571547.400 90.525 9.474 
2004 5248558.788 656889.322 5905448.110 88.876 11.123 
2005 5641546.106 779947.811 6421493.917 87.854 12.145 
2006 6050310.020 897672.204 6947982.224 87.080 12.919 
2007 6488891.667 993340.068 7482231.735 86.724 13.275 
2008 7089582.727 1188055.700 8277638.427 85.647 14.352 
2009 7580680.146 1426741.613 9007421.756 84.160 15.839 
2010 8223356.607 1807254.525 10030611.131 81.982 18.017 
2011 9188292.524 2170136.477 11358428.994 80.894 19.105 
2012 10089211.262 2631159.15 12720370.41 79.315 20.684 
2013 10884900.881 3111621.68 13996522.56 77.768 22.231 
2014 11642664.494 3690233.49 15332897.98 75.932 24.067 
2015 12310145.803 4407404.81 16717550.61 73.636 26.363 
2016 12745099.682 4918818.62 17663918.31 72.153 27.846 
Sources: The Central Bank of Malaysia and authors’ calculations.  
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Table 3. Lee and Strazicich unit root tests with two structural breaks. 
 Model A (Crash Model)  Model C (Trend Shift Model) 
 Statistics        Breaks Statistics             Breaks 
  𝐷1𝑡 𝐷2𝑡   𝐷1𝑡 𝐷2𝑡 𝐷𝑇1𝑡 𝐷𝑇2𝑡 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 -3.204 1998:01 
(5.793) 
2011:04 
(0.351) 
-5.846* 1997:06 
(9.101) 
2000:07 
(0.385) 
1997:06 
(-5.971) 
2000:07 
(5.699) 
𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 -11.748
*** 1998:4 
(-0.537) 
2005:10 
(0.251) 
-10.927*** 1996:10 
(1.064) 
1999:07 
(0.033) 
1996:10 
(-1.079) 
1999:07 
(4.254) 
𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 -3.170 1998:12 
(1.047) 
2008:04 
(0.201) 
-2.780 1997:07 
(2.921) 
2003:03 
(-0.198) 
1997:07 
(-10.121) 
2003:03 
(4.463) 
𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 -2.697 1999:11 
(-1.872) 
2008:10 
(-2.403) 
-6.155** 1997:04 
(2.912) 
2007:07 
(-2.313) 
1997:04 
(-5.462) 
2007:07 
(5.732) 
𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 -1.865 2006:03 
(-1.736) 
2008:10 
(-2.298) 
-4.087 1999:11 
(3.009) 
2006:02 
(4.362) 
1999:11 
(-4.586) 
2006:02 
(3.202) 
𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 -5.612
*** 1999:05 
(-0.750) 
2009:02 
(-0.607) 
-9.206*** 2008:05 
(13.381) 
2010:05 
(-1.424) 
2008:05 
(-9.327) 
2010:05 
(9.364) 
𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡 -1.886 1998:08 
(-4.336) 
2007:09 
(-1.201) 
-5.222 1998:03 
(-3.369) 
2010:06 
(0.488) 
1998:03 
(3.808) 
2010:06 
(-3.736) 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡 -4.404
** 1997:09 
(-4.596) 
1998:01 
(-7.314) 
-5.441* 1997:08 
(-0.454) 
1998:10 
(-3.041) 
1997:08 
(-5.122) 
1998:10 
(5.483) 
𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 0.275 1997:04 
(4.538) 
1999:04 
(1.627) 
-2.918 1997:11 
(1.230) 
2002:05 
(0.390) 
1997:11 
(-6.646) 
2002:05 
(0.533) 
𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 -5.510
*** 1998:02 
(-1.850) 
2003:08 
(-0.761) 
-7.787*** 1997:04 
(8.146) 
1999:12 
(-1.216) 
1997:04 
(-6.648) 
1999:12 
(6.491) 
𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑡 -1.454 2006:09 
(-0.209) 
2008:09 
(-0.351) 
-4.127 1998:03 
(-1.593) 
2008:08 
(-5.123) 
1998:03 
(-2.413) 
2008:08 
(-5.242) 
𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑡 -5.375
*** 2002:06 
(1.113) 
2010:02 
(1.748) 
-6.502*** 1997:12 
(-10.152) 
2000:11 
(1.677) 
1997:12 
(5.780) 
2000:11 
(-6.384) 
𝑙𝑚2𝑡 -2.684 1998:03 
(-1.377) 
2003:11 
(-2.484) 
-4.060 2000:12 
(-0.117) 
2006:04 
(-0.899) 
2000:12 
(-3.819) 
2006:04 
(2.845) 
𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 -5.166
*** 2002:12 
(0.649) 
2010:04 
(0.356) 
-8.004*** 1997:11 
(4.908) 
2005:06 
(-5.428) 
1997:11 
(-7.389) 
2005:06 
(7.781) 
𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 -3.200 1999:04 
(2.734) 
2008:06 
(-0.668) 
-2.914 1998:10 
(0.975) 
2011:07 
(0.351) 
1998:10 
(-7.742) 
2011:07 
(3.472) 
𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 -6.542
*** 1998:01 
(-3.201) 
2007:12 
(-3.063) 
-12.843*** 1997:11  
(-0.358) 
2000:03 
(0.388) 
1997:11 
(-7.924) 
2000:03 
(4.163) 
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡 -2.817 2001:04 
(-2.494) 
2008:01 
(-6.035) 
4.256 2002:06 
(-0.005) 
2007:12 
(0.206) 
2002:06 
(-2.138) 
2007:12 
(-5.352) 
𝛥𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡 -5.421
*** 1999:05 
(-1.189) 
2007:04 
(-0.800) 
-8.810*** 2005:08 
(-6.726) 
2008:09 
(8.330) 
2005:08 
(8.106) 
2008:09 
(-8.267) 
𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 -1.828 2010:04 
(-3.586) 
2012:08 
(1.566) 
-4.268 2001:12 
(0.391) 
2010:04 
(-4.137) 
2001:12 
(1.188) 
2010:04 
(-0.660) 
𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡 -4.621
*** 2002:08 
(1.3770) 
2013:05 
(-0.484) 
-6.855*** 2006:04 
(2.807) 
2009:06 
(-2.213) 
2006:04 
(-4.357) 
2009:06 
(6.469) 
𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡 -1.446 2005:08 
(-3.728) 
2008:08 
(-7.293) 
-4.428 1998:06 
(-1.203) 
2008:08 
(-6.661) 
1998:06 
(-0.310) 
2008:08 
(-3.206) 
𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡 -5.509
*** 1999:05 
(1.348) 
2007:02 
(-0.681) 
-8.568*** 2005:08 
(-6.384) 
2008:09 
(7.986) 
2005:08 
(7.844) 
2008:09 
(-8.017) 
Notes: 𝛥 is the first difference operator. 𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡, and 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡 denote respectively 
the log of total credit, the log of conventional credit, the log of Islamic credit, policy rate, the log of price level, the log of industrial production, 
the log of money supply, the log of the world commodity price index, the US federal funds rate, the log of the US industrial production index, 
and the log of the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar. The general to specific procedure is followed to find the optimum lag length, 
allowing for a maximum of 12 lags. The t-statistics are represented in parentheses (.). The critical values are obtained from Lee and Strazicich 
(2003). Model A allows for breaks in the intercept, whereas Model C allows for breaks in both the intercept and the trend. 𝐷1𝑡  and 𝐷2𝑡 refer 
to the first and second break dates, while 𝐷𝑇1𝑡 and 𝐷𝑇2𝑡 indicate the first and second break dates when allowing for the trend. 
***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Summary of descriptive statistics for the endogenous variables. 
 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 
Maximum 0.059 0.058 0.692 4.260 0.038 0.096 0.055 
Minimum -0.019 -0.020 -0.024 -5.180 -0.011 -0.076 -0.019 
Mean 0.008 0.006 0.034 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 
St. Deviation 0.008 0.009 0.069 0.590 0.003 0.026 0.010 
Skewness 0.964 0.994 5.584 -1.581  3.205 0.203 0.556 
Ex. kurtosis 7.322 7.145 42.658 40.598 32.750 3.722 4.503 
JB 
238.951 
*** 
225.567  
*** 
18107.124
*** 
15185.521
*** 
 9923.702 
*** 
7.357     
** 
37.301  
*** 
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256  
Notes: 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 , 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 , 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 , 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 , and 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡  denote respectively total credit changes, 
conventional credit changes, Islamic credit changes, policy rate changes, price level changes (inflation), industrial 
production growth, and money supply growth, respectively. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality. ***, and ** 
indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Multivariate threshold nonlinearity tests. 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
d m0 C(d) statistics P-value  d m0 C(d) statistics P-value  d m0 C(d) statistics P-value 
1 25 186.490 0.000  1 25 188.160 0.000  1 25 164.240 0.000 
1 50 174.990 0.000  1 50 176.150 0.000  1 50 157.070 0.000 
2 25 172.430 0.000  2 25 174.790 0.000  2 25 154.080 0.000 
2 50 188.660 0.000  2 50 190.040 0.000  2 50 168.210 0.000 
3 25 173.450 0.000  3 25 177.260 0.000  3 25 174.110 0.000 
3 50 188.780 0.000  3 50 194.410 0.000  3 50 184.250 0.000 
4 25 121.780 0.033  4 25 125.550 0.020  4 25 106.660 0.195 
4 50 120.120 0.042  4 50 123.730 0.025  4 50 105.140 0.224 
5 25 136.840 0.003  5 25 142.250 0.001  5 25 117.300 0.060 
5 50 131.730 0.008  5 50 137.170 0.003  5 50 113.370 0.096 
𝛾  5.561 AIC 2440.741  𝛾  5.558 AIC 2427.456  𝛾  5.556 AIC 3312.632 
Notes: The AIC refers to the minimum value of Akaike Information Criterion, C(d) statistics is based on the arranged regression model introduced by Tsay 
(1998), d  is the delay parameter, m0 refers to the number of initial observations, and 𝛾  represents  the optimum values of the threshold variable, 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑟 (the 
twenty-four month moving average of the IPI growth rate).  
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Table 6. Variance decomposition of inflation. 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 Linear VAR 
 
Linear VAR 
 
Linear VAR 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
1 0.342 0.134 0.639 1.553 97.675 0.000 
 
1 0.341 0.116 0.638 1.936 97.310 0.000 
 
1 0.346 0.179 0.885 0.006 98.930 0.000 
3 0.357 0.865 0.909 2.466 95.724 0.036 
 
3 0.357 0.845 0.928 3.362 94.837 0.029 
 
3 0.362 1.647 1.234 0.967 96.002 0.149 
6 0.358 0.984 0.924 2.554 95.309 0.230 
 
6 0.358 0.970 0.941 3.425 94.462 0.203 
 
6 0.363 1.790 1.251 0.964 95.554 0.442 
9 0.358 0.985 0.926 2.554 95.305 0.231 
 
9 0.358 0.971 0.943 3.425 94.458 0.204 
 
9 0.363 1.790 1.255 0.964 95.545 0.446 
12 0.358 0.985 0.926 2.554 95.305 0.231 
 
12 0.358 0.971 0.943 3.425 94.458 0.204 
 
12 0.363 1.790 1.255 0.964 95.545 0.446 
15 0.358 0.985 0.926 2.554 95.305 0.231 
 
15 0.358 0.971 0.943 3.425 94.458 0.204 
 
15 0.363 1.790 1.255 0.964 95.545 0.446 
 Upper Regime 
 
Upper Regime 
 
Upper Regime 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
1 0.277 3.219 0.299 0.876 95.606 0.000 
 
1 0.276 2.824 0.321 1.324 95.531 0.000 
 
1 0.220 7.640 0.024 1.781 90.556 0.000 
3 0.285 3.812 0.678 1.064 93.452 0.994 
 
3 0.285 3.441 0.681 2.228 92.642 1.007 
 
3 0.224 7.604 0.400 2.731 89.201 0.065 
6 0.286 3.840 0.757 1.173 92.709 1.521 
 
6 0.286 3.468 0.745 2.330 91.960 1.498 
 
6 0.225 7.591 0.546 2.751 88.851 0.260 
9 0.287 3.838 0.757 1.196 92.669 1.541 
 
9 0.286 3.466 0.744 2.354 91.917 1.517 
 
9 0.225 7.590 0.552 2.753 88.837 0.269 
12 0.287 3.838 0.757 1.198 92.666 1.542 
 
12 0.286 3.466 0.744 2.356 91.914 1.519 
 
12 0.225 7.590 0.552 2.753 88.836 0.270 
15 0.287 3.838 0.757 1.198 92.665 1.542 
 
15 0.286 3.466 0.744 2.356 91.914 1.519 
 
15 0.225 7.590 0.552 2.753 88.836 0.270 
 Lower Regime 
 
Lower Regime 
 
Lower Regime 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
1 0.364 0.643 0.667 4.268 94.422 0.000 
 
1 0.363 0.715 0.732 4.741 93.811 0.000 
 
1 0.413 1.589 1.041 0.919 96.451 0.000 
3 0.393 2.797 1.821 8.107 86.308 0.967 
 
3 0.392 2.781 2.018 8.263 85.992 0.945 
 
3 0.446 3.746 2.713 1.534 91.003 1.003 
6 0.394 2.911 1.896 8.239 85.879 1.075 
 
6 0.394 2.908 2.078 8.395 85.598 1.022 
 
6 0.449 3.860 2.857 1.666 89.992 1.625 
9 0.394 2.914 1.906 8.250 85.853 1.077 
 
9 0.394 2.910 2.090 8.400 85.577 1.023 
 
9 0.449 3.855 2.898 1.770 89.843 1.634 
12 0.394 2.914 1.907 8.251 85.852 1.077 
 
12 0.394 2.910 2.091 8.400 85.576 1.023 
 
12 0.449 3.854 2.900 1.792 89.816 1.639 
15 0.394 2.914 1.907 8.251 85.852 1.077 
 
15 0.394 2.910 2.091 8.400 85.576 1.023 
 
15 0.449 3.853 2.901 1.792 89.814 1.639 
Notes: Models 1, 2 and 3 are respectively based on the vectors 𝑌1,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡], 𝑌2,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡] and 𝑌3,𝑡
′ =
[𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡], respectively. 
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Table 7. Variance decomposition of output. 
 Model 1  
 
Mode 2  
 
 Mode 3  
 Linear VAR 
 
Linear VAR 
 
Linear VAR 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
1 0.750 1.053 0.092 0.020 0.062 98.773 
 
1 0.750 0.980 0.128 0.153 0.076 98.662 
 
1 0.791 0.794 0.227 1.687 0.013 97.278 
3 0.960 0.782 3.357 0.326 0.232 95.302 
 
3 0.962 0.741 3.653 0.242 0.280 95.084 
 
3 1.007 0.766 4.372 1.708 0.464 92.690 
6 0.973 0.787 3.671 1.024 0.621 93.897 
 
6 0.974 0.751 4.029 0.641 0.658 93.921 
 
6 1.026 0.746 4.966 1.681 1.221 91.386 
9 0.973 0.791 3.670 1.071 0.643 93.824 
 
9 0.974 0.754 4.029 0.677 0.675 93.865 
 
9 1.027 0.753 4.983 1.686 1.255 91.323 
12 0.973 0.792 3.670 1.072 0.643 93.823 
 
12 0.974 0.754 4.029 0.677 0.675 93.865 
 
12 1.027 0.753 4.983 1.686 1.255 91.323 
15 0.973 0.792 3.670 1.072 0.643 93.823 
 
15 0.974 0.754 4.029 0.677 0.675 93.865 
 
15 1.027 0.753 4.983 1.686 1.255 91.323 
 Upper Regime 
 
Upper Regime 
 
Upper Regime 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
1 0.583 6.911 0.890 0.356 0.011 91.832 
 
1 0.584 6.853 1.144 0.178 0.004 91.821 
 
1 0.596 2.683 0.268 0.144 0.594 96.311 
3 0.719 4.650 0.865 3.873 1.603 89.009 
 
3 0.719 4.678 0.952 3.907 1.409 89.054 
 
3 0.740 3.299 1.204 2.258 2.713 90.525 
6 0.750 4.299 0.853 7.265 1.851 85.732 
 
6 0.751 4.328 0.935 7.549 1.637 85.551 
 
6 0.774 3.271 1.380 3.483 3.465 88.401 
9 0.753 4.269 0.848 7.582 1.902 85.399 
 
9 0.754 4.295 0.928 7.921 1.679 85.177 
 
9 0.777 3.280 1.402 3.592 3.536 88.190 
12 0.753 4.267 0.847 7.603 1.906 85.377 
 
12 0.754 4.293 0.927 7.947 1.682 85.151 
 
12 0.777 3.281 1.403 3.598 3.540 88.178 
15 0.753 4.267 0.847 7.605 1.906 85.375 
 
15 0.754 4.293 0.927 7.949 1.683 85.149 
 
15 0.777 3.281 1.403 3.598 3.541 88.177 
 Lower Regime 
 
Lower Regime 
 
Lower Regime 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
 
Step S.E. 𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 
1 0.776 0.050 3.869 5.056 2.971 88.053 
 
1 0.776 0.077 3.998 5.531 3.058 87.336 
 
1 0.791 0.055 4.080 1.012 1.875 92.978 
3 0.982 0.379 14.057 4.026 8.231 73.308 
 
3 0.982 0.425 14.733 4.262 7.674 72.906 
 
3 0.998 0.354 10.458 5.003 7.432 76.752 
6 1.006 0.624 16.300 4.653 8.373 70.050 
 
6 1.007 0.677 17.477 4.459 7.857 69.530 
 
6 1.048 0.692 10.407 11.260 7.543 70.097 
9 1.008 0.637 16.282 4.854 8.474 69.753 
 
9 1.009 0.689 17.470 4.629 7.965 69.247 
 
9 1.056 0.690 10.390 12.204 7.551 69.165 
12 1.008 0.640 16.281 4.855 8.476 69.748 
 
12 1.009 0.692 17.469 4.631 7.967 69.242 
 
12 1.057 0.691 10.438 12.202 7.554 69.116 
15 1.008 0.640 16.281 4.855 8.476 69.748 
 
15 1.009 0.692 17.469 4.631 7.967 69.242 
 
15 1.057 0.691 10.437 12.209 7.556 69.107 
Notes: Models 1, 2 and 3 are respectively based on the vectors 𝑌1,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡], 𝑌2,𝑡
′ = [𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡] and 𝑌3,𝑡
′ =
[𝛥𝑙𝑚2𝑡, 𝛥𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡, 𝛥𝑙𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡 𝛥𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡], respectively. 
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Figure 1. Islamic banking assets in different countries (US$b) 
 
 
Sources: Central banks and Ernst and Young (2016) analysis. 
GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, ASEAN (Malaysia, Indonesia), South Asıa (Pakistan, Bangladesh),  
and Turkey and rest of the world (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, South Africa, Sudan, etc).  
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Figure 2.  % Credit of Conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia  
 
 
Sources: the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
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Figure 3. Regime classifications 
 
Note: Upper regime where 𝛾 ≥ 5.5615, is represented by the shaded areas obtained from the TVAR, specification of model 1.   
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 Figure 4.  Responses to interest rate shocks 
 
Note: The figures are obtained from model 1. 
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Figure 5. Responses to negative money supply shocks 
 
Note: The figures are obtained from model 1. 
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Figure 6. Responses of credit changes to interest rate shocks 
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Figure 7. Responses of credit changes to negative money supply shocks. 
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 Figure 8.  Responses of output growth to negative credit shocks 
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Figure 9. Responses of inflation to negative credit shocks 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1.  Responses to interest rate shocks (Model with exogenous oil price change) 
   
Note: The figures are obtained from model 1. 
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Figure A2. Responses of credit changes to interest rate shocks (before and after 2002) 
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Figure A3. Responses of credit changes to interest rate changes shocks (before and after 2004) 
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Figure A4. Responses of credit changes to negative money supply shocks (before and after 2002) 
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Figure A5. Responses of credit changes to negative money supply shocks (before and after 2004)  
   
 
